On February 12, 2026, the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning Uganda’s recently concluded 2026 general elections as “marred by abuses, widespread intimidation, fraud, violence and a nationwide internet blackout.” The resolution expressed concern about violations in the aftermath of voting, setting the context for subsequent diplomatic developments.
It was later reported that the European Parliament had summoned Uganda’s Ambassador to the European Union, HE Mirjam Blaak, to address concerns about the post-election situation in Brussels at a delegation meeting. Following this development, Ugandan officials and commentators raised questions about whether the European Parliament has the locus to summon an ambassador of a non-EU country such as Uganda.
It is important to clarify that yes, the European Parliament can—and in this case did—invite or summon the Ugandan ambassador accredited to the EU to respond to concerns regarding Uganda’s human rights situation, including alleged abuses surrounding the recent elections. However, the scope and limits of the European Parliament’s authority in this regard must be properly understood.
The European Parliament can:
- First, invite or request the presence of diplomats, including ambassadors accredited to the EU, at parliamentary hearings, committee meetings or delegation briefings. This is a political and diplomatic act tied to parliamentary oversight and the expression of institutional concern.
- Second, adopt resolutions condemning human rights abuses in non-EU countries, call for accountability and urge EU institutions such as the European Commission, the Council and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to take appropriate measures.
- Third, advocate for sanctions or other restrictive measures under EU human rights mechanisms, such as the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime. While such measures are formally decided by the Council, Parliament can strongly influence and push for them.
However, the European Parliament cannot:
- First, exercise legal compulsion over a non-EU ambassador. It does not possess sovereign authority to force a third-country envoy to appear or comply. Ambassadors represent their respective governments and enjoy diplomatic protections under international law.
- Second, issue binding orders to a third-country envoy or compel attendance at international fora such as the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. Any such engagement would be diplomatic and voluntary, or governed by intergovernmental arrangements.
- Third, bind the Government of Uganda to comply with parliamentary demands. The Parliament’s role is political and deliberative, not judicial or executive.
In the broader architecture of EU foreign relations, the European Parliament is only one of several institutions involved. The European External Action Service and the European Council, representing member state governments, are responsible for setting and implementing the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Therefore, when Parliament summons ambassadors accredited to the EU to respond to human rights concerns, it is engaging in political scrutiny and diplomatic signalling—not exercising legal authority that overrides diplomatic norms or Uganda’s sovereign control over its representatives.
If Uganda were to decline the invitation or refuse to attend, the consequences would be political and diplomatic rather than legal. Parliament cannot legally compel compliance. Nonetheless, the practical implications could be significant.
Refusal could heighten tensions between Uganda and EU institutions, trigger stronger public criticism through parliamentary resolutions and reduce diplomatic goodwill in Brussels. The EU delegation in Kampala, operating under the EEAS, could adopt a firmer tone in its engagements with the Ugandan government.
The European Parliament could also pass tougher resolutions, urge EU member states to take coordinated positions and call for debates within the Council of the European Union. While Parliament does not directly impose sanctions, it can substantially influence the direction of EU foreign policy.
There may also be implications for aid and trade cooperation. Uganda benefits from development assistance and trade preferences under frameworks such as the European Union–Africa partnership arrangements and the Cotonou and post-Cotonou agreements.
Although aid suspension would not be automatic, sustained human rights disputes combined with diplomatic non-cooperation could affect budget support, delay funding approvals and shape trade and development negotiations. Given that the EU remains one of Uganda’s major development partners, reputational considerations are not insignificant.
In conclusion, Uganda is not legally obliged under international law to comply with a summons from the European Parliament. States are sovereign and equal; diplomats represent their governments; and parliamentary invitations are political instruments rather than judicial commands. Ultimately, Uganda’s response will depend on its foreign policy calculations. The core issue is not legal violation but political signalling.
Solomon Muchwa Asiimwe is a Professor of International Relations and Security Studies at Nkumba University and Uganda Martyrs University. He is also Co-founder and Managing Researcher at the Security & Analysis Centre (SESAC), Entebbe, and a member of the East African Community Network of Academics and Researchers (EACANRI).